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Abstract
Computerized control systems play a vital role in modern critical infrastructure. These
systems are designed to provide better functionality and performance without concern-
ing of security. This leaves them extremely vulnerable to cyber attacks which may
lead to serious consequences. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to analyze the
vulnerabilities of such system to protect them against various threats. In this thesis,
several vulnerabilities of the open source automation system Beremiz were analyzed
while considering several attack vectors that may affect the control system. To resolve
some of the existing flaws, a secure communication protocol and an authentication
system was implemented. The total development process was done using Acceptance
Test Driven Development method and was tested with an automated testing framework
"Twister".
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1 Introduction
Computerized control systems play very important roles in modern production systems.
Programmable logic controllers can be PC based or specially designed computer that
are most commonly used as control system components. These controllers can be
programmed using special languages under the regulation of IEC International Standard
61161-3 to perform almost any kind of tasks [1]. PLC systems can be used with motors
and servo systems, providing complex multi-axis systems with advance and precise
control in rotation, motion, acceleration, braking and so on. They are used in industrial
electromechanical processes, for automated control of machinery in assembly lines,
power substations and in almost every automation system. PLC systems are usually
connectable to a computer by an Ethernet interface to interchange control and machine
data between the devices. They use SCADA – Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
systems with the HMI - Human Machine Interfaces as a mean of communication between
the operator and the control system. Anyone with the physical access to the HMI can
operate the control system and get important feedback from the system like production
parameters and rate and even with the proper control program can reconfigure the
operating procedure of the control system whilst the systems are fully operational, figure
1.1.
Figure 1.1: Block diagram of a control system
A few decades ago, controls systems were safe from any external attacks because of the
limited interconnection between other external systems and proprietary protocols which
were only available from specific vendors and used with specified technology. They were
only vulnerable to operators with limited knowledge of the system or who misused the
system for personal benefit. But later control systems were introduced with Ethernet
based protocol, utilizing non-proprietary technology with the capability of remote access
and better connectivity, making them exposed to cyber threats [2]. Also, almost every
PLCs are run by commercial operating systems like Microware OS, VxWorks which are
vulnerable to bugs and security issues just as they are in other operating systems like
8
1 Introduction
Microsoft Windows, Linux, Mac OS etc. Recently, several commercial PLCs were tested,
which are run on these operating systems and almost all are found to be vulnerable
to several bugs [3]. Bugs fixing and patching PLCs are difficult and different events
like compatibility and real time operation need to be considered before updating a PLC
system because of their complex natures. Thus patches for these vulnerabilities are
released at a very slow rate compared to other commercial operating systems.
A recent attack by the Stuxnet worm sabotaged a uranium enrichment program which
proves how severe the effects of these vulnerabilities can be. To protect a control
system from unauthorized users, first the attacker’s point of view should be taken into
consideration. An intruder monitors the regular execution of the programs to duplicate
the control program and reverse engineer the system [4]. So in order to increase the
safety and security of a control system, unauthorized access to the HMI and PLC along
with access to the control program must be prevented. To secure the control system, a
widely used safety approach named as "Onion Approach" as shown in figure 1.2 [5], can
be taken to identify the risky zone by using a security zone concept.
Figure 1.2: Security Zone Concept
The control system is usually placed in a secured place typically inside a building with
possibly on site guards with physical access restriction e.g. electric cabinet with lock,
thus safe from unauthorized access. The external zone of the system where network
access is available are more vulnerable to cyber-attacks which is the main concern of
this thesis.
The main weakness of the PLCs is that they are insecure by design. Any code written by
the corresponding engineering system can run on a PLC system without the legitimacy
of its origin. Commonly used open source tools for example Beremiz allows the PLCs to
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Figure 1.3: Intruder using same Ethernet link to gain access to the control program
Figure 1.4: Intruder blocking the operators access and operating the control system
directly
load and execute organization blocks without authentication. An intruder can gather the
necessary knowledge from the PLC’s documentation and source code and use the same
Ethernet link to access the PLC (figure 1.3) or even block the programmer’s access to the
system and control the PLC directly using a completely different logic (figure 1.4) since
there is no authentication or authorization, which could lead to serious consequences.
For these reasons, a built in security system is necessary in PLC, which will restrict
external access to the control program and allow authentication of users and authorize
access control at the very least.
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To resolve some of the existing flaws, Institut für Steuerungstechnik der Werkzeugmaschi-
nen und Fertigungseinrichtungen (ISW) has developed a secure access mechanism based
on an asymmetric encryption method called Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) and button
enhanced device authentication to secure the open source PLC Beremiz [6].
The objective of the work is to review the current security mechanism and develop an
integration strategy into the PYROSSL framework thus restricting external access to the
control program.
In addition, currently missing features such as authentication and secure data com-
munication should be implemented such that ease of use and overall functionality are
improved. To be able to commit the work to the open source project the implemented
mechanism must be testable and modular. The PYROSSL framework allows for such
implementation. In addition the whole project should be implemented with the test
based development paradigm, such that outsiders can test function without the necessity
to understand the underlying functions and source code. All functions, methods, etc.
must be testable and have a corresponding testing function. As Beremiz is mainly
implemented in python, the used language will be Python 2.7, if possible automated
testing tools should be used for functional testing. For authentication and authorization
PGP should be used. The engineering system must run on a Linux system in this case
Ubuntu, the runtime must run on a BananaPi embedded system.
2.1 Attacker Model
The new secure communication and authorization will be basis for further development
of secure access mechanisms. The PLC will run on a local system, there can be one or
more engineering systems with access to the control system. There will be no direct
physical access of attackers to the control system, assuming that the system is well
protected with guard and secured in a safe location with lock, therefore all attack vectors
based on physical access can be neglected. The only valid attack vector is via the network
interface, e.g. a logical attack vector either through direct contact by compromising
a maintenance worker or by establishing a direct link over the network. To explain
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the valid attack vector, imagine a scenario where a technician is working from home.
His/her laptop may have proper antivirus and firewall system installed, but that doesn’t
restrict the access to emails and web pages. Any one of those emails or webpages may
contain specially written malware by an attacker who wants to sabotage a particular
system the technician has access to. Now, as the technician has clicked on the malware,
it will run on the background. The antivirus failed to identify the malware as a threat
because it may only be a couple lines of code which was only made for this purpose and
therefore no previous antivirus signature of this malware.
Now when the technician uses this compromised laptop to access the control system,
the malware activates. The technician may or may not use a VPN system and proper
authentication protocol. The malware will wait till the login process completes, then
starts sending keystrokes and mouse movements and may be the screenshots of the
active windows to the attacker. The VPN installed in the laptop may be configured to
protect against such ’split tunneling’, but the malware has access to the raw network,
thus it can send anything it was programmed to send to the attacker[7].
Another attack vector can be explained using the recent attack on automation system
by the worm "Stuxnet". This worm enters to a system using a usb device and infects
all the machines running under Microsoft Windows. It contains forged certificates of
some reliable company, thus avoids getting detected by automated detection systems.
Then it checks whether the system is connected to the Siemens Step7 control system.
If it is not the target, the worm does nothing, but if it is the targeted device, the worm
connects to the internet and updates itself to the latest version. Then it monitors the
control operations of the system and then uses this knowledge to take control of the
centrifuges. Then it disables the feedback warning system to outside controllers and
spins the centrifuges to failure[8].
This thesis will focus on the ’Man in the middle attack’, not on compromised endpoints.
The following subsections will focus on the functional and non-functional requirements
and a top view of the entire workflow of of the thesis.
2.2 Functional Requirements
The communication between the computer and Beremiz is established via PYROSSL.
The authorization of the communication has to be done by asymmetric encryption.
The control program has to be encrypted and signed. The initial access can only be
authorized by physical access to the control system. Access to a third party system can
be granted by the means of an already authenticated system.
12
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2.3 Non- Functional Requirements
All the functions implemented in this program have to be testable. All implemented
functions should have corresponding functional tests. The access mechanism has to be
modularized such that all used libraries can be exchanged. All used functions or libraries
must be open source. All implemented functions must be thoroughly documented.
2.4 Workflow
The entire workflow of the thesis will be carried out according to the following flow
chart (figure 2.1):
Figure 2.1: Work-flow of the entire thesis
In the first step, the open source automation software "Beremiz" and its existing unse-
cured communication protocol will be analyzed. At the same time, the possible ways to
encrypt the communication and the appropriate testing approach will be determined.
Then the embedded system, "Banana Pi" which will act as the PLC system, several open
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source libraries for encryption and the testing frameworks will be analyzed. With the
knowledge of these researches, the system will be designed, implemented and tested.
After the implementation, the code will be optimized and checked for bugs. And then
finally the project will be documented.
In the next chapter the automation software, its communication protocol, the encryption
methods and the testing approach will be explained and illustrated in details.
14
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3.1 Beremiz
To introduce a common framework for the control system, IEC 61131-3 was introduced
which defines the logical programming blocks and languages of industrial controllers. It
was slowly accepted and implemented by the vendors, but due to different implemen-
tation and different file formats it was hardly possible to transfer programs between
different vendors. [9]. The automation sector, mainly consists of commercial software,
thus their operating safety could not be verified as their source code were closed. And
also the commercial PLC programs were too expensive, so the usage was limited only to
workstations and laboratory works. Beremiz was introduced with the intention to solve
the above mentioned problems.
Figure 3.1: Beremiz: Open source multi-platform IDE
[9]
Beremiz is a multi-platform integrated development environment (IDE) providing au-
tomation, control and HMI for machine automation along with an embedded runtime
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software. It is an open source Software distributed under the GNU license, conforming
to IEC-61131 among other standards like PLCOpen and CanOpen. It is independent of
the targeted device and can be installed in any operating system. It relies on four major
sub projects (figure 3.1):
• PLCOpen Editor,
• MatPLC’s IEC compiler,
• CanFestival and
• SVGUI.
The PLCOpen Editor is used to write PLC programs according to the IEC 61131-3
standard and the MarIEC compiler converts these into ANSI C codes. The most important
feature of Beremiz in this case is the ability of plugin extensions. Because of its open
source policy and plugin structure, new functions can be added to the environment
easily by implementing corresponding class definitions [9].
As previously mentioned, Beremiz has:
• Integrated Development Environment
• Runtime environment
Figure 3.2 shows the connection of Beremiz with its runtime environment. The IDE runs
on the host machine which is usually a conventional computer and the runtime environ-
ment which is usually run on an embedded computer and act as the PLC device. The
host can communicate with the target device, regardless of the hardware or operating
systems installed in them. The host can communicate and transmit data with the target
using an Ethernet connection.
Integrated Development Environment: A development environment which is basically
a graphical user interface (figure 3.3) is written in python and strongly linked with
PLCOpen specification. It is run by executing Beremiz.py and can be used to create
projects according to IEC 61131-3 standards program organization units(POUs). The
POUs can be programmed in all the five languages defined by IEC 61131-3 standard:
• Sequential Function Chart (SFC)
• Function Block Diagram (FBD)
• Ladder Diagram (LD)
• Structured Text (ST, equivalent to C/C++)
• Instruction List (IL, equivalent to assembler)
16
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Figure 3.2: Connection between IDE and runtime environment.
[10]
The programs written by this GUI are stored in XML format which can be used with any
other IEC 61131-3 editor that follows PLCOpen standard[9].
Runtime environment: A runtime environment runs on the target device by executing
Beremiz_service.py. This environment can execute the code that was compiled by
Beremiz.py and transmitted to it via network. When the runtime environment is running
on the target device and published on the network, it can be reached by its IP address
and anyone can access and operate the device by connecting to it.
3.2 PGP (Pretty good privacy)
PGP was introduced with the aim of confidentiality and authentication, which uses
both the symmetric key and asymmetric key (also known as public key) to encrypt and
decrypt something. A KEY is used by PGP to generate encrypted text which is called
17
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Figure 3.3: Integrated Graphical Environment.
ciphertext. The Keys are of two types: Private key and Public key. These keys are related
to each other. If something is encrypted using a Public key, it can only be decrypted
by the corresponding Private Key. In PGP, at first the text is encrypted using a session
key. This session key uses a symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt the plaintext
producing ciphertext for faster encryption and decryption and less overhead. Once the
ciphertext is created, the session key is encrypted using the recipient’s public key which
is then transmitted with the ciphertext to the recipient (figure 3.4)[11].
Figure 3.4: PGP encryption process
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Figure 3.5: PGP decryption process
The decryption of the ciphertext works in the opposite way. The recipient PGP uses
the private key to recover the one time usable session key, and uses it to decrypt the
previously encrypted ciphertext (figure 3.5).
The combination of these encryption and decryption methods completes the PGP – Pretty
Good Privacy encryption protocol [11].
This mechanism was used by Zhefeng Li on April 2015, on top of the insecure Pyro
- Python RPC(Remote Procedure Call) which is a client/server intercommunication
technology using the library pyro (python remote object) by which objects can talk to
each other over the network, with minimal programming effort [6].
3.3 Pyro (Python remote object)
Python remote object is a library written completely in Python that enable users to build
a communication protocol by which objects can communicate with each other over the
network. The users only have to write the python objects in a standard way and then by
adding only a few lines of codes Pyro completes the communications between the objects
all over the different machines on the network. The remote object over a network can
be called in the same way as the local object.
Pyro enables remotely calling an object on different servers. For example, an object
"russo" registered in the pyro daemon of server B can be called from server A.
Important concepts regarding PYRO[12]
• Pyro object: This is a normal python object, but registered with Pyro thus can be
accessed remotely. A class can also be used as a Pyro object, but then the user has
to define how Pyro will create objects from them while handling remote calls.
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Figure 3.6: PYRO concept.
• Proxy: A proxy object intercepts the method call on object like an actual object.
Pyro then transfers the call to the computer where the actual object is and returns
the results to the caller. The calling code is exactly the same as calling an actual
object so the caller doesn’t have to write a different code.
• URI: PYRO uses URI to identify an object.
• Pyro daemon (server): Pyro daemon monitors the remote method calls. forwards
them to corresponding actual objects and returns the results to the caller. All the
objects must have to be registered with the daemon.
• Pyro name server: Pyro nameserver is like a phone book for Pyro applications
which contains logical names of remote objects and corresponding numbers which
provides the location.
3.4 Secure Socket Layer (SSL)
SSL is a standard encryption technology, which establishes an encrypted connection
between two devices, typically a client and a server, thus ensuring security and privacy
of the transmitted data.
SSL provides the following advantages[13]:
• Privacy (Encryption)
• Integrity (Data has not been altered during transmission)
• Trust (Verified User)
A SSL transaction starts with the client requesting SSL connection to the server by
sending a handshake. Server responds to this request with its certificate that contains its
asymmetric public key and some other information like the validity date, owner, and the
domain or ip address of the server.
20
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Figure 3.7: SSL Interaction between Client and Server
The client then creates a symmetric session key and encrypts it with server’s public key
and sends it to Server. Server decrypts the encrypted session key using its asymmetric
private key, thus both parties have the symmetric session key which they can use
to encrypt and decrypt the transmitted data. The whole process is shown in figure
3.7[14].
However, it is possible that an attacker intercept this communication and provide
a certificate which may look legitimate (the domain or IP address of the certificate
being the same as the server) thus establishing a connection to the targeted device
and eavesdrop on the communication. To prevent this, there needs to be a way to
validate the trustworthiness of the certificates. A third party can be involved here, which
maintains a list of valid certificates. This third party is trusted by both the client and the
server, and it signs all the valid certificates with its private key. This signature proves
that the certificates are not forged and the data they represent are accurate.
The public key of the Certificate Authority is distributed to both the client and the server
which they can use during the connection to check for the authority’s signature. If the
signature is valid, the client and the server can be confident of the identity of each
other[15].
3.5 CA Certificates
As previously mentioned, Certificate Authorities/CAs issue digital certificates that contain
identification data which can be used for authentication of online identity. There are two
ways to obtain CA certificates. Commercial CAs are pretty expensive, but are trusted by
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almost every browser and device relying on them. But a local CA can also be generated
and used which is ideal for services that will not be offered to the public.
To obtain a signed digital certificate, the user/server has to generate a private/public
key pair and send the public key to the Certificate Authorities. When CA receives the
request, it verifies user’s identity and then signs the certificate using its private key and
return it to the user (figure 3.8)[16].
Figure 3.8: Certificate generation process.
A digital certificate signed by a Certificate Authority contains the following informa-
tion:
1. Name, domain/IP and other attributes of the user
2. Public key of the user
3. Issue and expiry date of the certificate
4. Identity of the Certificate Authority issued it
5. Digital signature of the Certificate Authority
To verify the digital signature on the certificate, the user/server need the public key of
the certificate authority. The public key is usually distributed inside a certificate, so it is
basically a certificate issued by the Certificate Authority and signed by its private key.
The private key used by the Certificate Authority to sign certificates is also called root
key. Normally Certificate Authorities are in business and they issue a lot of certificates.
Thus, if they only use root certificates, it puts a lot of exposure into it. If the root
key is misplaced, or gets stolen, the result can be disastrous. The thieves will be able
to supplant any certificates signed by this key, or can start making their own trusted
certificates and sell them to black market. To deal with this threat, the best practice is
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to keep this key offline and unused as much as possible. This is where Intermediate
certificates come in. The topology of the CA certificates is shown in figure 3.9[17].
Figure 3.9: Topology of Certificates.
Intermediate certificate is issued by the root certificate specifically to issue end user
certificates on its behalf, thus reduces the risk of compromise of the root certificate.
When intermediate certificate is created, a certificate chain is also created that provides a
chain of trust. When an application wants to verify a certificate signed by an intermediate
certificate, it also has to verify the intermediate certificate against the root certificate.
This verification can be done using the certificate chain.
Every time the root certificate signs the intermediate certificate or the intermediate cer-
tificate signs an end user certificate, a certificate revocation list is generated. Whenever
a certificate gets stolen, the issuer can revoke the certificate and the thief will not be
able to use the certificate again.
3.6 Protection against stolen Certificates
The process of using SSL is safe as long as the certificates are not lost or stolen. If in any
case the private key gets compromised, the root certificate can still be used to revoke
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the certificates generated using this key. But to add an extra level of security, the keys
can be protected by a passphrase using the DES3 encryption. If any keys get stolen, the
thief will not be able to use it to authenticate himself because the server will ask for
the password. All the key files, even the root key file can be password protected, thus
if compromised, nobody will be able to use the root key to sign any other certificates
without knowing the password.
3.7 Encrypting algorithm
3.7.1 Asymmetric Encryption
Encryption algorithms like RSA, ECC are used for asymmetric encryption. Usually public
keys are generated and distributed because it is mathematically impossible to recreate
the private key from the public key.
RSA: RSA is the most widely used asymmetric algorithm. It is based on the difficulty
of factoring the product of two large prime numbers known as the factoring problem.
A public key is created using two large prime numbers with an auxiliary value. The
public key can be used to encrypt something, but to decrypt data encrypted with the
public key, one has to know the prime numbers. As an example, user A can encrypt a
message using user B’s public key without knowing his private key. User B can decrypt
the message as only he has the private key. RSA also used to sign a message, user A can
sign the message using his private key and user B can verify that message came from
user A using A’s public key. But as RSA is a comparatively slow algorithm, it is not used
directly to encrypt something, rather used with symmetric key encryption to optimize
speed[18].
3.7.2 Symmetric Encryption
Encryption algorithm like Twofish, AES or Blowfish are used for symmetric key algorithm,
but AES is the most commonly used one.
AES: AES is based on the combination of substitution and permutation which is known
as substitution - permutation network. It is very fast in both hardware and software and
uses block ciphers. It has a fixed block size of 128 bits and key size of 128, 192 or 256
bits and applies cryptographic key and algorithm to block of data as a group.
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The AES algorithm starts with a random number. The data and the key are scrambled in
it through four mathematical rounds: SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns and AddRound-
Key. In the SubBytes, a lookup table is used to determine which byte is replaced with
which one. In the ShiftRows, the first row is left untouched, the second row is shifted to
the left by one offset, the third row by two and the fourth row by three. But only for
the case of 256bit AES, the third row is shifted by three and the fourth row is shifted by
four. In the MixColoumns step, an invertible linear transformation is used to combine
the four bytes in each column. In the AddRoundKey round, a round key is derived from
Rijndael’s key scheduler and this key is added to each byte of the state correspondingly.
In the final round, all the steps except the MixColumns step are repeated again[19].
3.8 PYROSSL
To integrate SSL connection is Pyro, an extension to the normal validator is used which
is Pyro.protocol.BasicSSLValidator. This validator checks whether a client has supplied a
SSL certificate or not. Python normally does not support SSL, so the following libraries
have to be used with python to enable this feature[12].
• M2Crypto
• OpenSSL (needed by M2Crypto)
M2Crypto: M2Crypto is a python wrapper for OpenSSL, which features RSA, DSAm
DH, HMACs, message digests and symmetric ciphers(including AES). It provides SSL
functionality for both client and server applications, and is thread safe.
Pyro daemon needs to be modified such way that it uses SSL instead of regular sockets.
This can be done by passing a specific parameter while creating the daemon:
daemon = Pyro.core.Daemon(prtcol=’PYROSSL’)
When this daemon is modified like this, the pyro objects connected to this daemon will
be registered to the nameserver using the PYROSSL protocol that will tell pyro to use
SSL instead of regular sockets. A special SSL connection validator mentioned earlier can
be added to the daemon which will check for client certificates. Pyro will automatically
deal with the SSL if everything is set accordingly, thus the client programs can be left
unchanged.[12].
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3.9 Securing the communication link
There are several ways to secure a communication line. The user can choose the one
which suits his/her security needs[17].
• Encryption of the communication path
• Server requires the Client to have certificates signed off by known CAs
• Server requires the Client to have certificates signed off by known CAs and checks
its fields
Encrypted connection: This is a very basic setup which only encrypts the communi-
cation. In this setup, the server has a private key and a certificate and the client has a
known CAs list. The client will only connect to the server if the server’s certificate is
signed by one of its known CAs (figure 3.10)[17]. In this way the client doesn’t need to
have a certificate.
Figure 3.10: Setup for encrypted connection.
Server checks Client’s certificate: This procedure is same as the above with an extra
level of security. In this setup, server and client both checks each others certificates
against their known list of CAs (figure 3.9). If this validates, a secure connection is
established[17].
Server checks the fields in Client’s certificate: This procedure is same as the previous
method with another level of security. In this process, server checks the fields of client’s
certificates and if there is any mismatch with its configuration the connection will not be
established (figure 3.12)[17].
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Figure 3.11: Connection setup where server requires the client to have authentic certifi-
cates.
Figure 3.12: Connection setup where server checks the fields of client’s certificates.
3.10 Analyzing Network Protocol
After the implementation of SSL, the communication link must be checked to verify
whether it is truly encrypted or not. There are several network analyzer which can be
used to check this. For example: Wireshark, Tcpdump, Netcat, Ettercap, etc. For this
thesis Wireshark will be used.
Wireshark: Wireshark is one of the most widely used network protocol analyzer. It can
be used to capture and analyze the traffic running on a network. It has a very rich and
powerful feature set, some of them are given below[20]:
• Protocols can be inspected in very deep level.
• Pakets can be captured in real time and can be analyzed later or even offline.
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• Cross platform support. Works on Windows, linux, OS X, FreeBSD and almost
every-others.
• User friendly Graphical User Interface which can be used to browse captured
traffic.
• Contains one of the most powerful display filters.
• Supports various capture file formats.
• Can be used to decrypt protocols.
• Results can be exported in XML, CSV or in plain text.
Figure 3.13 shows the interface of Wireshark. When the capture command is given,
it captures all the transmitted data and shows on the screen. Using this software it is
possible to verify whether the transmitted data is actually encrypted or not.
Figure 3.13: Wireshark interface showing captured data.
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Agile software development is a set of software development methodology in which the
solutions and specifications evolve throughout the development cycle till the delivery
of the finalized product. This methodology focuses on frequent inspection, continuous
improvements and adaptation through close collaboration of the development team and
the clients.
In February 2001, the Agile Manifesto was published with the aim of "Uncovering better
ways of developing software by doing it and helping others do it.", which is based on
twelve principles[21]:
• Provide continuous and fast delivery of the developed application to gain customer
satisfaction.
• Accept change in specifications throughout the development cycle.
• Deliver functional bits of the developing application to the customer as soon as
they are ready usually within weeks.
• Close collaboration between developer and the clients.
• Highly motivated individuals are charged with the development task.
• Direct communication between parties, usually face to face.
• Progress of the development is measured by developing software
• Constant pace
• Higher priority on design and technical excellence.
• Simplicity - the art of maximizing the amount of work not done -is essential.
• Self-organizing teams
• Continuous adaptation according to the changing specifications and requirements.
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There are several agile development methods, all of which provides developments and
adaptation throughout the development cycle with close collaboration of self organizing
teams. The most commonly used methods are TDD, ATDD and BDD[22][23][24].
Test Driven Development(TDD): TDD is a way of software development in which the
user first writes the test file, run the test which will fail as there is nothing to test and
then write the minimal code to pass the test. Then the code is refactored according
to the requirements and again tested to check whether its working or not. Normally
the main focus of the TDD is to test the low level functionality and unit testing, which
enables easier refactoring and produces simpler code. The process is repeated until the
required specifications are met.
Acceptance Test Driven Development(ATDD): TDD is a perfect ways of testing
whether the code is functioning or not, but it doesn’t check whether the written code
was even required to begin with. ATDD is a process where the clients are included in
the development phase before the coding starts. It is a collaboration of the developers,
tester, owner and the clients, thus insures precise understanding of the requirements
and the acceptance criteria so everyone knows exactly what needs to be implemented.
Behavior Driven Development (BDD): BDD is a combination of the principles of TDD
and Domain-Driven Design. BDD focuses on the behavior of the system rather than the
implementations. It guides the functionality developments according to the expected
behavior. The purpose and usability of the code are described in the language of Domain-
Driven Development and the native language of the developers (usually English) defined
in GIVEN, WHEN and THEN (GWT) format.
4.1 Methodology selection
As mentioned earlier, TDD is a paradigm of writing a test first, then the code with
optional refactoring if necessary. The problem with TDD is that it doesn’t guide the
developer from where to begin or how it should be structured or whether the written
code is even required or not.
ATDD involves clients in the beginning of the development process and focuses on the
requirements to guide the development which allows a close and easier collaboration
between all the involved parties.
BDD is mainly customer focused and provides a clear understanding of the system
behavior to the developers from the customer points of view.
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Although implementing and automating ATDD is a quite extensive work requiring high
technical efforts from the developers, the benefits of applying ATDD in a project surpasses
everything[22][23][24].
• ATDD focuses on client needs which is quite important in software development.
Designing the functions becomes easier when the developer can see the "whole
top down thing" from the beginning rather than the bottom up approach of TDD
which deals with small portions of a code at one time.
• It is possible for a code to have full code coverage and pass all the unit tests with
broken functionality. Or even a code can have complete functionality, but still
doesn’t do what the client asked for. On the other hand, considering the acceptance
tests are written accurately, if a code passes them all, if will definitely fulfill client
needs.
• The clients and the developers are closely involved from the beginning of the
development phase, eliminating all the possible chances of miscommunication or
last minute changes because of lack of understanding of the end results.
4.2 Test Automation
4.2.1 General
In software testing, there are several special software which can be used to control and
execute test cases and compare the actual results with the intended outcomes. This trend
is called test automation. This procedure is used specially to automate the repetitive
testing tasks in a software development process and helps with continuous testing and
delivery of the developing software.
During software development, there are some testing tasks, for example: regression
testing, is very time consuming to do manually, which is also not much effective to find
certain defects. Test automation can be used in these cases to perform these types of
testing effectively. Another advantage of using test automation is that, once the tests
are automated, they can be run repeatedly and quickly, thus cost effective for testing of
software with long development cycle.
Test Automation can automate the following types of tests[25]:
• Functional: Tests the functionality of the software against requirement.
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• Regression: Tests whether the behavior of the system has been altered or not.
• Stress: Test the absolute stress capabilities of the system.
• Exception: Forces error conditions in the system.
• Performance: Tests the performance of the system to see whether it is adequate
enough according to project requirements.
• Load: Determines the maximum load point after which the performance of the
software degrades.
4.2.2 Test Automation Framework
A "Test Automation Framework" is an integrated system that provides an automated
execution environment for the test scripts and simplifies the automation effort. Function
libraries, test data sources and reusable modules are integrated in this system which act
as small building blocks that are assembled as a process. The main advantages of using
a testing framework are listed below[26][27][28]:
• Reusability and Reliability: One of the best aspects of Testing framework is that
the test suites are reusable. The same test cases can be used for multiple tests and
on multiple platform. In test framework, same tests perform the same operations
every time they run therefore eliminates human error.
• Full coverage: Automated testing increases the depth and scope of the test there-
fore increasing the quality of the developing software. Tests can be built that cover
every feature of the developing software and can be run automatically and simul-
taneously on multiple device with different configurations without any manual
intervention. Thousands of complex test cases can be executed at once, which is
not possible in manual test.
• Cost effective: During the development period, a software has to be tested fre-
quently with every update and after every patch. Manually performing this repeti-
tive tests are very costly. Test automation reduces these costs of repetitive tests as
the same test can be run multiple times and simultaneously thus saving a lot of
time.
• Minimal manual intervention: Once the test cases are written and the test suites
are set up, no manual intervention is necessary to perform the test.
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• Easy reporting: In test framework, the reporting has become very easy. The reports
can be generated and stored on the server or even sent to the user via email after
each test. The user does not have to be on location to check the results.
4.2.3 Selecting criteria
While selecting a test automation, there are some criteria that should be kept in mind
[26][27][28]:
• Cross platform support: Test Automation enables the user to perform a thorough
regression test throughout all the platforms with reusable test case repositories.
Thus single script can be applied against multiple devices without recreating it
specifically for each platform. This saves time and money. Without cross platform
support, this is not possible.
• Reporting: Ease of reporting and its delivery to the user should be considered
while selecting a test automation system.
• Debugging: Different testing tools have different debugging system. The frame-
work with better debugging and analysis system helps in the long run.
• Stability: Often longer tests need to be performed in the framework, so the stability
of the framework is crucial.
• Ease of Use: Ease of use of the testing framework reduces the learning time.
• Documentation: The more documentation available for the framework, the easier
to operate it.
• Extension and plugin support: The framework should support plugin extension so
that user can install or create the plugins he/she needs for the testing purpose.
4.3 Selecting an Open source Test Automation Framework
There are several Open source Test Automation Frameworks in the market and to select
the most favorable framework, the most rated frameworks on the market were analyzed
and compared against their technical features, usability, economical efficiency, ease of use
and installation difficulty and the results are shown in the table below[29][30][31].
The comparison chart shows that Twister framework is more mature than the other
frameworks mentioned above and beats them in almost every category. The main
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Twister Robot Framework STAF Concordion Cucumber
Stability
Configurability
Monitorability
Intelligibility
Third Party Libraries
Low Maintenance Costs - - - - -
Reporting
Test Cases Creation
Documentation
: Better : Moderate : Poor
Table 4.1: Comparison of Automated Testing Tools.
strength of Twister is that it is completely configurable over the internet. It also supports
a large collection of add-ons which can be added to the framework very easily.
Twister Framework complies with almost all the programming languages. It is a versatile,
flexible, highly configurable and the monitoring of its operations is very easy. The
usability of Twister framework is better than others. It has a web interface and a Java
applet for creating, editing and running the test suites. Twister is very well documented
and does not require much user expertise. The reports can be customized according to
user needs very easily and though the installation procedure is a bit difficult, once set
up, it is easily operable[29][30][31].
4.4 Twister Testing
Twister is an Open Source test automation framework as described earlier. Before
starting with Twister, there are several things which have to be kept in mind[32]:
• Applet: This is the graphical user interface of Twister Framework. This Applet is
written in JAVA and can be accessed through a browser. Any user with access to it
can create projects, tests, run, pause and stop the test executions, view the reports,
add plugins and can configure it according to the requirements.
• Central Engine: Central engine is just a collection of services that twister offers. It
is used to send libraries to user execution engines, generate and store the logs and
reports and send these to the configured email address.
• Client Machine: The execution engines are installed in this machine.
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• Execution Engine (EE): This engine is user specific. It waits for the start signal and
sends the logs to the central engine. When start signal is generated, it launches
the Runner and when the stop signal is generated it instantly kills the Runner.
• Project Files: The project files are stored in XML format. It contains the test suites
and the test files and can be run on multiple test beds.
• Reporting: It is used to view the results generated by the executed tests and can
be fully customized.
• Web Interface: This central Engine web interface is used for debugging. The
user can view the logs and statistics through this interface and can also turn the
execution engines on or off.
• Runner: Runner connects to the central engine to gain access to the libraries,
checks for dependencies and waits for them to finish, skips a test if there is skip
command, starts the appropriate scriptrunner for specific programs.
• Server Machine: The central engine is installed in this machine.
• User Machine: The machine which can be used by an user to access the framework.
4.4.1 Key Features
The key features of Twister are given below[32][33]:
• Multi-User architecture: Supports multiple user groups with different roles.
• Web based GUI: User friendly web based graphical user interface.
• Realtime monitoring: Realtime monitor of the test execution is possible.
• Distributed execution: Every user has their own processes.
• Parallel testing of systems: System Under Tests(SUT) can be run in parallel.
• Auto generation of reports: Reports are generated automatically after each execu-
tion and can be forwarded to the configured email address.
• Scripting languages support: Supports almost all scripting languages.
• Plugin support: Plugins can be added to the system for more functionality.
• Advance statistics: Advance statistics can be generated for each test.
• Multiple logs: Multiple logs can be generated for different levels: debug log, test
log, running log.
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• Customizable delay: Delays can be added between tests.
• Global variable: Support global variables.
• Panic word support: If a Panic word is assigned and found in the command line
interface logs, kills every process.
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As previously mentioned, Beremiz communicates with its runway server using PYRO.
This communication is performed without any encryption and authentication. For this
reason this process is completely insecure and vulnerable to man in the middle attack.
Before designing an encryption system, first the current communication system will be
discussed.
5.1 Current communication protocol
To establish connection in current communication protocol, the first step is to run
the runtime environment on the target device. This can be obtained by entering the
following code in the terminal:
$ sudo python Beremiz_service.py -i XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX
Here, the XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX has to be replaced by the corresponding ip address. This ip
address can be viewed by typing the following code in the terminal:
$ ip add
The ip address is the address marked red on the figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: IP Address.
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Then the runtime server will start and it will wait for the host (figure 5.2). The host can
connect to the target by using the "Pyro object’s uri".
Figure 5.2: Runtime Server started.
After that, in the host device, a project has to be created and then in the config tab of
the project file, the URI_location (figure 5.3) has to be set in exactly as the ip address
and the port of the target device (figure 5.2). There is a "Build" button which can be
used to build the code. Then clicking the "Connect" button will establish a connection
between the host and the runtime server. Then the user can transfer the compiled code
it to the target device.
Figure 5.3: Configuring the host device.
5.2 Design Approach
To enable encryption in the communication protocol Secure Socket Layer (SSL) will be
used which is already explained. Thus the communication between the PC system and
the embedded system will be encrypted and a hacker will not be able to eavesdrop on
the communication.
Authentication will be done by using the SSL with an extra layer of security. The keys
generated for SSL will be encrypted using the encryption algorithm DES3 that can only
be unlocked by a passphrase. If by any chance the certificates get stolen, the thief will
not be able to pose as a client because the certificates are useless without the passphrase.
If the thief wants to create his own certificates, the server will decline connection to
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him because his certificates will not be signed by server’s known lists of Certificate
Authority.
As seen from figure 5.2, Beremiz runtime server starts in PYRO, not in PYROSSL. The
first task of this thesis would be to modify the Beremiz_service.py so that it starts with
PYROSSL and accepts SSL connections. In Beremiz_server.py, from the ’Server’ class:
def Start(self):
pyro.initServer()
self.daemon=pyro.Daemon(host=self.ip_addr, port=self.port)
Here it can be seen that the server starts without the PYROSSL protocol an there is no
option to check the certificates. To start runtime server with PYROSSL, these features
need to be added here.
Then from the host side, from the class PYRO_connector_factory:
if servicetype == "PYROS":
schemename = "PYROLOCSSL"
# Protect against name->IP substitution in Pyro3
Pyro.config.PYRO_DNS_URI = True
# Beware Pyro lib need str path, not unicode
# don’t rely on PYRO_STORAGE ! see documentation
Pyro.config.PYROSSL_CERTDIR = os.path.abspath(str(confnodesroot.ProjectPath) +
’/certs’)
if not os.path.exists(Pyro.config.PYROSSL_CERTDIR):
confnodesroot.logger.write_error(
’Error : the directory %s is missing for SSL certificates (certs_dir).’
’Please fix it in your project.\n’ % Pyro.config.PYROSSL_CERTDIR)
return None
else:
confnodesroot.logger.write(_("PYRO using certificates in ’%s’ \n")
% (Pyro.config.PYROSSL_CERTDIR))
Pyro.config.PYROSSL_CERT = "client.crt"
Pyro.config.PYROSSL_KEY = "client.key"
PYRO_connector_factory works such way that when connecting to the runtime server, if
the URI is changed to ’PYROS’ from ’PYRO’, it will try to establish a secure connection. It
will look into the project folder for a folder named ’certs’ which includes the ’client.key’
and ’client.crt’ files. If the directory or the certificates are missing it will show the
following error:
Error : the directory ’certs’ is missing for SSL certificates. Please fix it in your
project.
So, the certificates have to be placed in a folder named ’certs’ inside the project folder.
Also, there is no option to verify the certificate chain of the SSL certificates which
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is a requirement for using Certificate Authorities. This feature is also needs to be
implemented.
The next task is to implement a button system by clicking which the necessary certificates
will be generated automatically and will be placed in the appropriate directory.
A point to be noted that, only the root and host(client) certificates will be placed in their
designated directory. The runtime server’s certificates will have to be delivered manually
by email or any other storage device.
When the certificates will be created, they will also be encrypted with the DES3 encryp-
tion. Thus, whenever the server will try to use the certificates, it will ask for a ’passphrase’
in the terminal. The connection cannot be established without this ’passphrase’.
If the certificates are in the corresponding directory, and the passphrase is correct, then
M2Crypto will check the validity of the certificates:
from M2Crypto.SSL import Connection
Connection.timeout = None
Connection.gettimeout = _gettimeout
Connection.settimeout = _settimeout
# M2Crypto.SSL.Checker.WrongHost: Peer certificate commonName does not
# match host, expected 127.0.0.1, got server
Connection.clientPostConnectionCheck = None
M2Crypto checks the validity date of the certificates and the common name with the
host name. If the host name does not match with the common name, it will give the
following error:
Peer certificate commonName does not match host, expected 127.0.0.1, got server
If the certificates are valid and the common name matches the host, it will establish the
connection and the future communication in this session will be encrypted.
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According to the functional requirements and as both the development and runtime
environment of Beremiz is written in Python, the choice of programming language was
Python. The communication between the development environment and the runtime
environment will be carried out by PYROSSL. Initial access can only be granted by the
certificates generated by the asymmetric private key generated by RSA algorithm. If
this key gets stolen, the thief will not be able to reproduce certificates because the key
is protected by DES3 encryption. All the functions implemented in this thesis will be
based on acceptance test driven development and will be tested using the automated
testing framework Twister. All the libraries that will be used in this thesis will be open
source.
6.1 Starting the runtime server with PYROSSL
The first task was to integrate SSL functionality in the runtime server. To do this, the
server class of Beremiz_server.py was modified. The following codes were added to
enable this functionality:
Pyro.config.PYROSSL_CERT="server.crt"
Pyro.config.PYROSSL_KEY="server.key"
Pyro.config.PYROSSL_CA_CERT="ca.crt"
Pyro.config.PYRO_DNS_URI=True
Pyro.core.initServer()
# Construct the Pyro Daemon with our own connection validator, using SSL
self.daemon = Pyro.core.Daemon(prtcol=’PYROSSL’, host=self.ip_addr, port=self.port)
After the modification, when Beremiz_server is executed, it will prompt for a passphrase
(figure 6.1).
If the passphrase is correct, the runtime server it will start with PYROSSL (figure 6.2).
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Figure 6.1: Prompt for passphrase in the terminal of runtime server.
Figure 6.2: Runtime server started with PYROSSL
6.2 Enabling Certificate Authority crosscheck in the IDE
The current configuration of the IDE side does not cross checks for a Certificate Authority.
To enable this, the class PYRO_connector_factory was modified. The following line was
added to the existing class:
Pyro.config.PYROSSL_CA_CERT="ca.crt"
This line of code points M2Cryoto to the Root certificate with which it will compare the
signed certificates. If the signature on the user end certificates matches with the root
certificate, the authenticity of the user end certificates will be verified.
6.3 Creating the CA certificates
To act as a certificate authority, one has to work with the private and public certificates.
The first step to create and sign certificates is to create the root pair which consists of
root key and root certificate that is the identity of the CA. Then this root certificate can
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be used to create and sign intermediate certificates or can be used to make end user
certificates directly. In this thesis, only once set of server and client certificates had to be
generated. For this reason, root certificates were used directly to create and sign user
end certificates.
The first step in creating CA certificates is to create a root key. This can be done by
typing the following code in the terminal:
openssl genrsa -des3 -out ca.key 1024
Here the key file is generated using RSA 1024 bit algorithm and encrypted with DES3
encryption algorithm.
Then the root certificate file is created using the root key file:
openssl req -new -x509 -days 3650 -key ca.key -out ca.crt
During this process, user has to input the necessary information (Country Name (2 letter
code),State or Province Name, Locality Name, Organization Name, Organizational Unit
Name, Common Name, Email Address) to the terminal. The root certificate is always
self signed.
The next step is to create a server key. This can be done by typing the following code in
the terminal:
openssl genrsa -des3 -out server.key 1024
Same as the root key, the server key is generated with RSA 1024bit algorithm and
encrypted with DES3 encryption algorithm. Then a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) is
generated by using the following command:
openssl req -new -key server.key -out server.csr
This will be used to create the server certificate which will be signed by the root
certificate. The server certificate can be generated by using the following command:
openssl x509 -req -days 3650 -in server.csr -CA ca.crt -CAkey ca.key -set_serial 01 -out
server.crt
During this process user has to input the necessary information (Country Name (2 letter
code),State or Province Name, Locality Name, Organization Name, Organizational Unit
Name, Common Name, Email Address) to the terminal. Note that the common name
must be the same as the domain name or IP address of the server, otherwise certificate
validation will fail.
The client certificate is generated in the same way as the server certificate. First the
client key is generated by RSA 1024 algorithm and then encrypted with DES3 encryption
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algorithm. Then the certificate signing request is generated and using that client
certificate is generated which will be signed by the root certificates.
Note that while signing a CSR for a third party, the certificate authority does not need
their private key, so only providing a certificate signing request to the authority is
sufficient.
To integrate this process in Beremiz, the ProjectController.py file was modified and a
new class was added to the file. The basic idea behind generating the root certificates is
given below:
The first step is to check whether the certificates already exist or not:
# Checks whether the certificates exists or not
certs = os.path.abspath(str(confnodesroot.ProjectPath) + ’/certs’)
if not os.path.exists(certs):
os.mkdir(certs)
C_F = join(certs, CERT_FILE)
K_F = join(certs, KEY_FILE)
if not exists(C_F) or not exists(K_F):
This points to the certificate directory. If the directory does not exist, creates it and
checks for the certificates. If certificates are not available, the following codes run inside
the ’if’ statement[34]:
# create a key pair
k = crypto.PKey()
k.generate_key(crypto.TYPE_RSA, 1024)
This creates a key pair using OpenSSL and with RSA 1024bit algorithm. In the next step
a certificate will be generated which will be self signed:
# create a self-signed cert
cert = crypto.X509()
cert.get_subject().C = raw_input("Country: ")
cert.get_subject().ST = raw_input("State: ")
cert.get_subject().L = raw_input("City: ")
cert.get_subject().O = raw_input("Organization: ")
cert.get_subject().OU = raw_input("Organizational Unit: ")
cert.get_subject().CN = raw_input("Certificate Authority: ")
cert.set_serial_number(1000)
cert.gmtime_adj_notBefore(0)
cert.gmtime_adj_notAfter(315360000)
cert.set_issuer(cert.get_subject())
cert.set_pubkey(k)
cert.sign(k, ’sha1’)
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In the next step, the key file and the certificate file are opened and OpenSSL dumps the
information to them:
open(C_F, "wt").write(
crypto.dump_certificate(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, cert))
open(K_F, "wt").write(
crypto.dump_privatekey(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, k))
These codes along with a button were developed and integrated with the IDE.
6.4 Button development and integration
To improve the usability, a button had to be integrated in the Beremiz GUI which will be
used to create the certificates automatically. The file ProjectController.py was modified
to achieve this feature. The button was placed in the toolbar of Beremiz which is only
available after the user creates or loads a project, figure 6.3.
Figure 6.3: Shortcut button to create SSL certificates automatically.
This button was linked with the certificate generation function. When an user presses
on this button, it checks whether certificates already exist in the ’certs’ directory or not.
If the certificates are already there, it will show a notification that certificates already
exist, figure 6.4.
Figure 6.4: Notification showing that certificates already exist.
If there is no certificate available, it will launch a popup window for the user to input
the required information, figure 6.5.
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Figure 6.5: Popup window for the user to input the certificate details.
After giving the inputs when the user will press the submit button, there will be a
notification that the certificates were generated successfully, figure 6.6.
Figure 6.6: Notification of Certificate generated.
Users can develop the project, build it and configure the connection properties. To
connect to PYROSSL the URI location in the config tab has to be set to ’PYROS’ and the
IP address has to be exactly the same as the runtime server, figure 6.6. After this the
user can try to connect to the runtime server.
Figure 6.7: Configuration of the connection properties for SSL connection
When a connection is attempted, the user will be prompted for the passphrase, figure
6.8.
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Figure 6.8: Prompt for passphrase in the terminal of IDE.
If the passphrase is correct, M2Crypto will cross check the information provided in the
certificates and will connect to the runtime server, figure 6.9.
Figure 6.9: SSL connection established.
Figure 6.10: Secure transmission of data.
After the SSL connection is established, the user can transfer the program to the runtime
server safely with now fear of man in the middle attack, figure 6.10.
6.5 Flow of Operation
In the first step of the operation, the user has to create or load a project. If there is no
certificate, the user has to generate certificates and transfer the server certificates along
with the root certificate to the runtime server. Once the certificates are in place, the user
can start the runtime server by using the passphrase. Then the user can connect to the
runtime environment by entering the required passphrase in the IDE terminal. PYROSSL
with the help of M2Crypto will check the certificate’s validity and the common name
and the certificate authority’s signature and if everything matches will start a secure
communication protocol and the future communication will be encrypted. The flow of
the operation is shown in the figure 6.11.
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Figure 6.11: Operational Flowchart.
6.6 Testing the Encryption with Wireshark
The transmitted data can be analyzed by using Wireshark. After setting up the connection,
Wireshark was used to capture the data. If the communication is not encrypted, the
transmitted data will be visible as plain text, but if the communication is encrypted, the
data will be visible as random number. Figure 6.12 shows the screenshot of a Wireshark
data capture. As seen from the screenshot, the data passing in between the development
environment and runtime environment is encrypted.
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Figure 6.12: Data captured and shown on screen via Wireshark.
6.7 Testing the code
The requirement for this thesis were to implement SSL in current communication
protocol and develop a button function which will generate necessary certificates,
encrypt them with a password an place them in the designated directory. The SSL
encryption was tested by using Wireshark. The test functions for later part were written
in Acceptance Test Driven Development (ATDD) method. This process involved creating
tests before writing the code and these tests represents the expected behavior of the
developing software. The tests were automated by writing the supporting code in a
framework friendly format (in this case, for Twister) while implementing the feature.
ATDD cycle starts with Discussing the requirements, then distilling the tests in framework
friendly format, then develop the code and integrate the tests in it and then when the
demo software is ready test and optimize it (figure 6.13)[35]. So to follow this cycle,
the first step was to ’Discuss’ the requirements.
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Figure 6.13: Acceptance Test Driven Development (ATDD) cycle.
The questions discussed for automatically generating the certificates can be written as:
• Where the certificates will be generated? Current directory or specific location?
• What happens if the directory is not there?
• What happens if some of the certificates are already in the directory?
• What happens if all the certificates are in the directory?
During the discussion, it was agreed that the certificates will be generated in a directory
named ’certs’ in the project folder. If the directory is not there, it will be created. If some
certificates are already in the designated directory, the function will show a notification
that those specific certificates already exist and will skip creating those and continue
with the next certificate. If all the certificates are available, it will show a notification
that all the certificates are available.
The next step in ATDD was to ’Distill’ the tests in a Framework-Friendly format. The test
cases and the actions can be listed as:
Test Case Action Arguments
Directory exists? Go the next step Yes
Create directory No
Certificates exist? Show Notification Yes
Create certificates No
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The next step was to ’Develop’ the code and integrate the tests. The tests were run first
and then they were failed as expected as there was nothing to be tested. The test cases
were written without writing the code and automating them. The code was developed
gradually and integrated with the test function and the test was repeated with Twister.
Observing the test fail for the right reason and try to make the test pass was the main
way to test the tests.
To test the final code, first the framework was configured to run the test 10 times and
then the report was captured. Figure 6.14 shows the test setup configurations.
Figure 6.14: Configuration setup for the test.
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Figure 6.15 shows the number of file tested and the number of failed and passed tests.
As seen from the test, the code has passed successfully.
Figure 6.15: Result of the test.
In the following figure the detail report of the test result is given:
Figure 6.16: Detail log of the test.
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7.1 Summary
With the help technological advancement, control systems have evolved from hardwired
relays and meters to digital Programmable Logic Controller platforms with computerized
Human Machine Interfaces. Integration of network components has enabled users to
control a system remotely from the other side of the world. But unfortunately, this
high advancement of technology and integration with network has opened the door for
hackers to maliciously attack the control system which may lead to serious consequences.
Almost all automation systems are designed with functionality and performance keeping
in mind, without concerning for security. Thus, when added with the network, they have
become the main safety and security issue of the network society. For this reason, with the
rise of technological advancement, the demand for security has also increased[3][2].
In this thesis, several security risks of the control system are presented. For general con-
sideration, the open source software Beremiz was considered. Beremiz was vulnerable
to hackers because there was no authentication system in it and the data it transferred
was completely unencrypted. Therefore, anyone with the access to the Ethernet network
could easily hack the system and manipulate it. To resolve these issues, the objective of
this thesis was to encrypt the communication path and install an authentication system
so that only authorized user can access and control the system.
Based on the objective, an system was introduced that generates necessary certificates
for the encryption and encrypts them with another encryption algorithm. Thus the
communication path is now encrypted and the users with proper authorization only can
establish the connection.
The results were verified using the packet capture software Wireshark and the total de-
velopment process was done using Acceptance Test Driven Development. The developed
code was tested with an automated testing framework Twister and the code passed the
tests successfully.
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7.2 Future Works
In the next steps, the server and the root certificates generated in the IDE have to be
delivered to the runtime server by using email or some data storage device. This leaves
a security issue. The attacker can block this delivery and send forged certificates to the
runtime server. As without the certificates the runtime server has no other authentication
method, the runtime server may get compromised and the attackers get what they want
from the runtime.
To prevent this issue, and out-of-band authentication method [36] can be implemented
in the future. This will make man in the middle attack extremely difficult. Out-of-band
authentication uses two separate communication channel at the same time to provide
authentication. This provides much better security, because if the attackers get access
to the security credentials of any one channel, the authentication procedure will not
be complete without the second authentication network. The authentication method is
initiated in the primary channel, and then concludes by authenticating in the second
channel. This second channel of authentication can be done by a QR code or maybe a
button enhanced security system.
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